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The current fiscal policy in the United States is not sustainable. This is primarily because of the ongoing
demographic changes, such as retiring baby boom generations, declining mortality rates, and stable but
relatively low fertility rates. This aging population will reduce the share of the working-age population and
increase the share of the retired population in the future; thus it will likely decrease labor supply per capita
and output per capita relative to the economy without the aging population. The aging population will also
reduce the government’s tax revenue per capita, as the government relies more on taxes on labor income, and
will increase the government’s transfer spending per capita, as elderly households are the main recipients of
Social Security benefits. Therefore, the aging population will create a sizable fiscal gap in the government’s
fiscal policy, and the government will eventually have to cut its transfer spending or raise tax rates or both.
These additional fiscal policy changes aimed to close the fiscal gap will likely exacerbate the negative effect
of the aging population in the economy.
This paper extends a heterogeneous-agent overlapping-generations (OLG) model with uninsurable wage
and mortality shocks by incorporating an aging population projected by the U.S. Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) and analyzes the general-equilibrium effect of the aging population on the behavior and welfare
of individual households, the government’s budget, and the aggregate economy. The households are hetero-
geneous with respect to their age, working ability (hourly wage), wealth, and the average historical earnings
that will determine their future Social Security benefits. Each year, households receive idiosyncratic wage
shocks and determine their consumption, working hours, and saving to maximize their lifetime utility, taking
factor prices, the government policy schedule, and the population projection as given. The government fis-
cal policies, such as the income taxes and the Social Security programs, involve both inter-generational and
intra-generational redistribution and risk sharing. Therefore, this setting is critically important to analyze
the effect of the aging population on the overall economy and the government budget as well as the effect of
the future fiscal policy changes on individual household’s behaviors and wellbeing.
This paper then calibrates the model to the 2014 U.S. economy. One of the difficulties in incorporating
the aging population to a heterogeneous-agent OLG model is, however, the population distribution in the
current year (2014 in this paper) is not stationary, thus, the model cannot describe the baseline economy
as a stationary equilibrium. For that reason, this paper calibrates the model to the 2014 U.S. economy by
solving it for an equilibrium transition path between 1975 and 2200. As discussed in the above, the aging
population creates the government’s budget deficits in the future and surpluses in the past under the current-
law policy. In the aging-population baseline economy, this paper assumes that the government decreases
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or increases its consumption spending so that the debt per capita stays at the same level after productivity-
growth adjustment.1
This paper finally conducts a set of policy experiments that replace the government’s financing assump-
tion to close the fiscal gap generated by the aging population. Although most of the fiscal imbalances are
generated by the Social Security program, especially its old age and survivors insurance (OASI) program
and hospital insurance (HI) program, there is no reason for the government to close the fiscal gap within the
Social Security system. Therefore, this paper introduces a broad range of stylized fiscal policy changes—
those in the uniform lump-sum taxes, the progressive income tax rates, the flat consumption tax rate—in
addition to the changes in Social Security benefit schedules and payroll tax rates. The paper addresses how
the behavior and well-being of individual households and the overall economy will differ under these fi-
nancing assumptions of the cost of the aging population. Not surprisingly, there are a trade-off between
efficiency (e.g., GDP growth) and equity (e.g., social welfare) and a trade-off between the well-beings of
the current households and the future households; and this paper quantitatively assesses the pros and cons
of each alternative fiscal policy.
The main findings of this paper are as follows: First of all, the macroeconomic and budgetary effects of
the aging population are large by itself. In the aging-population baseline economy, where the feedback effect
of future fiscal policy changes are turned off, under SSA’s population projection Alternative 2 (intermediate
scenario), the projected demographic changes will decrease GDP per capita by 5.4% in 2039 and 7.2% in the
long run, primarily because the share of the working-age households in the economy declines over time. To
balance the budget, the government will have to cut its primary deficits as a share of GDP by 3.6 percentage
points in 2039 and by 5.5 percentage points in the long run. The fiscal gap in the current-law fiscal policy,
measured by the present discount sum of the current and future primary deficits, is 2.94% as a percentage
of the present discount sum of the current and future GDP under this intermediate population projection. In
other words, the government will have to reduce its primary deficits by 2.94% of GDP each year starting in
2014 in order to make its current fiscal policy (programs) sustainable.
If the government tries to close this fiscal gap, more realistically, by increasing taxes or cutting transfer
spending or both, the effect of the demographic changes with the additional fiscal policy change will differ
significantly, depending on how the government finances the budgetary cost of the aging population. For
example, GDP per capita will decrease by 10.0% in 2039 and 25.8% in the long run, relative to the economy
1In the model economy of this paper, the government’s consumption is not in the household’s utility function. Thus, by
assumption, its change does not affect the household’s behavior and wellbeing. The current-law fiscal policy is not sustainable,
but it is uncertain when and how the government will change its policy to make it sustainable. To construct an aging-population
baseline economy, therefore, this paper adjusts the government consumption to turn off any behavioral feedback from future policy
changes.
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without the aging population, if the government increases marginal income tax rates proportionally; but
GDP per capita will increase modestly by 1.7% in 2039 and 3.1% in the long run if the government instead
decreases Social Security benefits proportionally. Cutting Social Security benefits looks better than raising
marginal income tax rates in terms of its effects on output. However, the welfare results indicate that
households in the current generation—those aged 21 and older at the time of the policy change—strongly
prefer increasing marginal income tax rates to cutting Social Security benefits, at the expense of households
in the future. If the government cares about the level of future output and the inter-generational equity at
the same time, it is probably safe to consider one of the following options: (1) raising the flat consumption
tax to balance the budget each year, and (2) cutting Social Security benefits and raising payroll tax rates
proportionally roughly on 50-50 basis instead. As the fiscal gap generated by the demographic changes
increases over time, delaying the policy reform (by increasing the government debt) is not desirable in terms
of both the economic output and the intergenerational equity.
Needless to say, this is not the first paper that incorporates the U.S. aging population into a general-
equilibrium OLG model and analyzes its macroeconomic and welfare effects. Relative to the previous
literature, however, the present paper has a variety of strengths in the model economy and calibration pro-
cedure.
To the best of my knowlege, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) are the first to incorporate the historical
and predicted changes in the fertility rate to a large-scale deterministic general-equilibrium OLG model.
Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2007) incorporate the U.S. demographic changes to their 12-income-
level deterministic general-equilibrium OLG model. Ludwig, Schelkle, and Vogel (2012) also incorporate
the U.S. demographic changes to their deterministic general-equilibrium OLG model with human capital
accumulation. The present paper conducts the similar exercises in a heterogeneous-agent OLG economy
with idiosyncratic wage shocks and mortality shocks, so that the model can capture not only the inter-
generational redistribution effect of the government fiscal policy but also its intra-generational redistribution
and risk-sharing effects.2 De Nardi, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Sargent (1999) incorporate the SSA’s population
projection to their stochastic general-equilibrium OLG model with idiosyncratic preference and endowment
shocks. Yet, they use linear-quadratic approximation around the certainty-equivalent equilibrium to deal
with idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, their paper does not fully consider precautionary motives for saving
and labor supply.3
2The previous literature that uses this class of models, without the aging population, includes I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and
Joines (1995), Huggett (1996), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009).
3 There are several other papers that analyze the effects of the demographic changes of countries or regions outside the United
States. For example, Rios-Rull (2001) incorporates the Spanish population distribution to his stochastic general-equilibrium OLG
model with aggregate fertility shocks. Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2006, 2007) construct a two-region large-open economy
4
Most recently, Kitao (2014) incorporates the demographic change based on Census Bureau’s popula-
tion projection into her heterogeneous-agent OLG model with idiosyncratic wage and mortality shocks,
which is similar to the one in the present paper. Kitao first calibrates the model to the 2010 stationary
economy with the stationary population distribution, then she changes the conditional survival rate by age
and the population growth rate of newborn households to analyze the aging population. However, her 2010
stationary benchmark economy fails to capture the current population distribution with a large group of
babyboomers, thus, the model cannot accurately predict the macroeconomic effect and budgetary cost of the
aging population in the short run.4 The present paper instead incorporates SSA’s population projection as
well as historical population directly and calibrates the model to the 2014 benchmark economy by solving
the model for an equilibrium transition path between 1975 and 2200.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the heterogeneous-agent OLG model
with the projected aging population; Section 3 explains the calibration of the model to the 2014 benchmark
economy; Section 4 shows the and the aging-population baseline economies; Section 5 explains the policy
experiments that replace the future government policies to close the fiscal gap; and Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 The Model Economy
The model economy consists of a large number of overlapping-generations households, a perfectly com-
petitive representative firm with constant-returns-to-scale technology, and a government that can credibly
commit to a fiscal policy. The time is discrete, and one model period is a year, which is denoted by t. In a
long-run stationary equilibrium, the economy is assumed to be on a balanced-growth path with a constant
labor-augmenting productivity growth rate, µ, and a constant (long-run) population growth rate, ν. In the
following model description, individual variables other than working hours are growth-adjusted by (1+µ)−t,
and aggregate variables are adjusted by [ (1+µ)(1+ν) ]−t.
general-equilibrium OLG model and incorporate the United Nations global population projections to it. Krueger and Ludwig
(2007) construct a three-region large-open economy general-equilibrium OLG model and incorporate the United Nations population
projections, too. Chen, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2007) incorporate the Japanese population distribution to their deterministic
general-equilibrium OLG model. Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2009) also incorporate the Japanese population projection to their
deterministic general-equilibrium OLG model.
4See, for example, Figure 13 in Kitao (2014) and Figure 8 in the present paper. Labor supply is higher with the demographic
shift during the first 30 years (2010–2040), relative to the benchmark economy, in Kitao (2014), whereas labor supply is 8.1% lower
by 2039 under SSA’s intermediate projection in the present paper. The relatively quick decline in labor supply in the latter is mainly
predicted by the retirement of the baby-boom generation.
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2.1 The Households
Households in the model economy are heterogeneous with respect to their age, i = 21, . . . , I , beginning-
of-year wealth (net worth), a ∈ A = [ amin,∞), average historical earnings used to calculate Social Security
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits, b ∈ B = [ 0, bmax], and labor productivity, e ∈ E =
[ 0,∞). The households enter the economy and start working at age i = 21, and they can live at most to age
I = 120. In each year, t, the households receive idiosyncratic and age-dependent working ability shocks, e,
and they each choose their consumption, c, working hours, h, and thus wealth at the beginning of the next
year, a′, to maximize their expected (remaining) lifetime utility.
The households are, for simplicity, assumed to start receiving OASI benefits at their own full retirement
age (FRA), i = IR˜, which is between ages 65 and 67, depending on their birth year, although they can
continue working after their FRA if they find it optimal.5 The average historical earnings, b, are used to
approximate the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) and determine OASI benefits. The individual
working ability, e, follows a first-order Markov process.
2.1.1 The State Variables
Let s and St denote the individual state of the household and the aggregate state of the economy in year
t, respectively,
s = (i, a, b, e), St = (Xt(s), wG,t),
where Xt(s) is the cumulative distribution function of households, and wG,t is the government’s net worth
per household, both at the beginning of year t. Let pi,t be the (long-run) growth-adjusted population of age-i
households in year t. The distribution function, Xt(s), satisfies∫
A×B×E
dXt(i, a, b, e) = pi,t.
Let Ψt be the government’s policy schedule as of the beginning of year t,
Ψt =
{




where cG,t is the government’s consumption per household, trLS,t is a lump-sum transfer per household,
5Social Security OASI benefits are partially taxable when the sum of adjusted gross income and 50 percent of benefits is above
$25,000 (single) or $32,000 (married filing jointly). Thus, it is optimal for the workers to delay the Social Security benefit claim
until they are fully retired. For simplicity, this possibility is excluded in the model economy.
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τI,t(·) is a progressive income tax function, τP,t(·) is a Social Security Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and
Hospital Insurance (OASDHI) payroll tax function, trSS,t(·) is an OASDHI benefit function, and τC,t is a
flat consumption tax rate.6 The government’s consumption is not assumed to be in the household’s utility
function and thus does not affect the household’s decision on private consumption and labor supply, while
lump-sum transfers directly affect the household’s decision through the intertemporal budget constraint. The
flat consumption tax, τC,t, is assumed to approximate other federal revenues, such as those from excise taxes
and customs duties.











where φi,t is the conditional survival rate at the end of age i in year t, given that the household is alive at
the beginning of age i in year t. For simplicity, the population distribution and the corresponding mortality
rates are assumed to be deterministic, and households have perfect foresight about the future population
distribution.7
The population projection, Φt, affects the model economy in the following ways: First, the projection
of the household’s own survival rates and corresponding longevity have an influence on the household’s
consumption, working, and saving decisions through their retirement planning. Second, projected changes
in the population distribution by age (especially, the share of the working-age population) directly affect
macroeconomic variables, factor prices, and the government’s budget and fiscal policies. Finally, these
changes in future factor prices and the government’s fiscal policies generate additional effects on the house-
hold’s optimal decisions—both the current decision and future decisions—in a dynamic general-equilibrium
economy.
6In this paper, the population growth rate changes over time, and the growth rates also depend on the population projection. For
a better comparison of alternative fiscal policies over time as well as under different population assumptions, the current-law fiscal
policy in this paper is assumed to keep the government’s net worth per household, wG,t, and consumption per household, cG,t, at
the same levels after the productivity growth adjustment, rather than to keep the government’s aggregate net worth and aggregate
consumption unchanged.
7Introducing aggregate uncertainty, such as total factor productivity shocks and mortality/fertility shocks, to a heterogeneous-
agent model causes the “curse of dimensionality” problem. When there are aggregate shocks, under the rational expectation
assumption, we need to solve the household’s optimization problem for all possible paths (sample paths) of the aggregate economy,
which is computationally infeasible in a heterogeneous-agent economy.
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2.1.2 The Optimization Problem
Let v(s,St; Ψt,Φt) be the value function of a household at the beginning of year t. Then, the house-
hold’s optimization problem is
(1) v(s,St; Ψt,Φt) = max
c,h,a′
{
u(c, h) + β˜φi,tE
[
v(s′,St+1; Ψt+1,Φt+1) | s
]}
subject to the constraints for the decision variables,
(2) c > 0, 0 ≤ h < 1, a′ ≥ a′min(s),
and the law of motion of the individual state,





(1 + rt)a+ wteh+ trSS,t(i, b) + trLS,t + qt(i)− τI,t(wteh, rta, trSS,t(i, b))(4)












where u(·) is a period utility function, a combination of Cobb–Douglas and constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA),




β˜ is a growth-adjusted discount factor explained below, and E[ · | s ] denotes the conditional expected value
given the household’s current state. The household’s decision variables are constrained: consumption, c, is
strictly positive; working hours, h, are nonnegative and are less than a time endowment (unity); and wealth
at the beginning of the next year, a′, satisfies a borrowing constraint, a′ ≥ a′min(s).8 In the law of motion,
rt is the interest rate, wt is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, qt is the distribution of accidental
bequests explained below, 1{·} is an indicator function that returns 1 if the condition in { } holds and 0
otherwise, IR is set at 65 so that the household’s OASI benefits are calculated based on its growth-adjusted
earnings between ages 21 and 64, η is the ratio of taxable labor income to total labor income, and ϑmax is
8For simplicity, the borrowing limit (the lowest-possible wealth level) is assumed to depend only on the household’s age i. See
Section 3.4 for the assumption of a′min(s).
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the maximum taxable earnings for the OASI program.9 The household’s wealth at the beginning of the next
year, a′, is adjusted by the productivity growth rate, 1 + µ. The average historical earnings for a household
at the beginning of the following year, b′, are calculated as wage-indexed, and the price indexation of AIME
after age 60 is reflected in the Social Security benefit function.10
2.1.3 The Distribution of Households
The household’s problem is solved for c, h, and a′ for all possible states.11 The household’s decision
rules are obtained as c(s,St; Ψt,Φt), h(s,St; Ψt,Φt), and a′(s,St; Ψt,Φt), and the average historical
earnings in the next year are also obtained as b′(s,St; Ψt,Φt) from equation (5).
Households are assumed to enter the economy at age 21 without any assets and working histories, thus,
∫
A×B×E
dXt(21, a, b, e) =
∫
E
dXt(21, 0, 0, e) = p21,t,
where p21,t is the population of age-21 households in year t. In the benchmark year, which is 2014 in this
paper, the growth-adjusted population of age-21 households is normalized to unity, that is, p21,2014 = 1.
Let xt(s′) be the density function of households corresponding to Xt(s′). Then, the law of motion of the
growth-adjusted population distribution is, for i = 21, . . . , I ,
xt+1(s








where ν is the long-run population growth rate, and pii(e′ | e) is a probability density function of working
ability e′ at age i+ 1 given that the working ability is e at age i.12
9In the current Social Security system, AIME is calculated based on the highest 35 years of growth-adjusted earnings. However,
keeping the previous 35 highest earnings as the household’s state variables will make the household problem computationally
intractable. In the model economy, therefore, AIME is approximated by the growth-adjusted earnings of all ages before IR = 65.
10See Appendix D in SSA (2014) for a detailed explanation on wage indexing.
11Because the household’s individual state vector, s, includes three continuous variables, a, b, and e, the number of all possible
states is infinite. Therefore, the individual state space is discretized, and the optimization problem is solved for all discretized
states in each year. The aggregate state of the economy, St, consists of a distribution function, Xt(s), and thus the aggregate state
space is infinitely dimensional. When there are no aggregate shocks in the model economy, however, there is a way to avoid this
dimensionality problem. See Nishiyama and Smetters (2014) for the computational algorithm.
12In this paper, xt(s) and pii(e′ | e) are described as density functions for notational simplicity. There is a mass of households
with an individual state, (a, b, e) = (0, bmax, 0), and xt(s) is a mass function on this point. Also, pii(e′ | e) is a conditional
probability mass function when e = e′ = 0.
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2.1.4 The Aggregation
Total private wealth, WP,t, the government’s net worth, WG,t, capital stock, Kt, and labor supply in
























In each year, the representative firm chooses the capital input, K˜t, and efficiency labor input, L˜t, to
maximize its profit, taking factor prices, rt and wt, as given. Thus, the firm’s optimization problem is
(11) max
K˜t,L˜t
F (K˜t, L˜t)− (rt + δ)K˜t − wtL˜t,
where F (·) is a constant-returns-to-scale production function, F (K˜t, L˜t) = AK˜θt L˜1−θt , with total factor
productivity A, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The firm’s profit-maximizing conditions are
(12) FK(K˜t, L˜t) = rt + δ, FL(K˜t, L˜t) = wt,
and the factor markets are cleared when
(13) Kt = K˜t, Lt = L˜t.
2.3 The Government
The government policy schedule, Ψt, as of year t is assumed to be credible. The government collects
taxes and makes its consumption and transfer spending as scheduled in Ψt. In addition, the government
collects wealth left by deceased households (accidental bequests) and distributes it uniformly to all working-
age households.
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2.3.1 The Government’s Revenue and Expenditure
The government’s income tax revenue, TI,t, payroll tax revenue for Social Security, TP,t, and consump-






τI,t(wteh(s,St; Ψt,Φt), rta, trSS,t(i, b);ϕt) dXt(s),(14)












where ϕt is one of the parameters of the income tax function, and (τO,t, τD,t, τH,t) is a vector of the OASI,
DI, and HI payroll tax rates. The government’s consumption spending, CG,t, non-Social Security transfer
























trSS,t(i, b;ψO,t, ψD,t, ψH,t) dXt(s),(19)
where ψO,t is a parameter of the OASI benefit function, and ψD,t and ψH,t are adjustment factors of DI and
HI benefits, respectively.
For simplicity, the government is assumed to collect remaining wealth held by deceased households at
the end of year t and distributes it in a lump-sum manner in the same year. Because there are no aggregate
shocks in the model economy, the government can perfectly predict the sum of accidental bequests during






(1− φi,t)(1 + µ)a′(s,St; Ψt,Φt) dXt(s).
Suppose that the government redistributes the accidental bequests uniformly to all working-age house-
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The government budget satisfies the following constraint,
(1 + µ)(1 + ν)WG,t+1 = (1 + rt)WG,t + TI,t(ϕt) + TP,t(τO,t, τD,t, τH,t) + TC,t(τC,t)(22)
− CG,t(cG,t)− TRLS,t(trLS,t)− TRSS,t(ψO,t, ψD,t, ψH,t).
2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
This section defines a recursive competitive equilibrium for the model economy.
Definition of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: Let s = (i, a, b, e) be the individual state of house-
holds, let St = (Xt(s), wG,t) be the state of the economy in year t, let Ψt be the government policy schedule
committed at the beginning of year t,
Ψt =
{













be the population projection and corresponding survival rates as of
the beginning of year t. A time series of factor prices and the government policy variables,
Ωt =
{




the value functions of households, {v(s,Ss; Ψs,Φs)}∞s=t, the decision rules of households,
d(s,Ss; Ψs,Φs) =
{





and the distribution of households, {Xs(s)}∞s=t, are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, for all s =
t, . . . ,∞, each household solves the optimization problem of equations (1) through (5), taking Ss, Ψs,
and Φs as given; the firm solves its profit maximization problem of equations (11) and (12); the govern-
ment policy schedule satisfies equations (14) through (22); and the goods and factor markets clear, thus
13Uniformly distributing the accidental bequests is a common simplification in the literature. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009)
assume that all surviving households receive accidental bequests uniformly. Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) assume that working-
age surviving households receive uniform accidental bequests with probability η, where η is the ratio of deceased households to the
working-age surviving households.
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these satisfy equations (7) through (10) and equation (13). The economy is in a stationary (steady-state)
equilibrium—thus, on the balanced-growth path—if in addition, Ss = Ss+1, Ψs+1 = Ψs, and Φs+1 = Φs
for all s = t, . . . ,∞.14
2.5 Social Welfare Measures
Suppose that the economy is in the initial equilibrium in year t = 0 and that the government introduces
a new policy at the beginning of year 1. Then, the rest-of-the-lifetime value of a household of state s =
(i, a, b, e) is denoted by v(s,S0; Ψ0,Φ0) before the policy change and v(s,St; Ψt,Φt) for t = 1, . . . ,∞
after the policy change.
2.5.1 Consumption Equivalence
Under the veil-of-ignorance welfare measure, welfare gains or losses of newborn households (age i =
21) at the beginning of t = 1, . . . ,∞ are calculated by uniform percent changes, λ21,t, in the baseline
consumption path that would make their expected lifetime utility equivalent to the expected utility after the










Similarly, the average welfare changes of households of age i = 22, . . . , I at the time of the policy
change (t = 1) are calculated by the uniform percent changes, λi,1, required in the baseline consumption











Note that λi,1 for i = I, . . . , 21 shows the cohort-average welfare changes of all current households alive at
the time of the policy change, and λ21,t for t = 2, . . . ,∞ shows the cohort-average welfare changes of all
future households.
14To solve the model for a stationary equilibrium, the population distribution needs to be constant, after growth adjustment,
in the long run. Even if this paper assumes the fertility rates to be constant after 2100, it takes several hundred years before
the population distribution completely stabilizes because the number of newborn babies depends on the population distribution of
women ages 15–50.
15The calculation of λi,t depends on the period utility function. With the Cobb–Douglas and CRRA utility function, equation
(6), when consumption proportionally increases by λi,t/100, the household value increases by (1 + λi,t/100)α(1−γ) − 1.
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2.5.2 Compensating Variations
The compensating variation of a household with individual state s = (i, a, b, e) is a one-time negative
wealth transfer, cv(s), that restores the baseline welfare level in the alternative economy after the policy
change. The compensating variations of newborn households (age i = 21) at the beginning of t = 1, . . . ,∞
are calculated as cv(s21,St; Ψt,Φt) such that
v(21, a− cv(s21,St; Ψt,Φt), b, e,St; Ψt,Φt) = v
(
21, a, b, e,S0; Ψ0,Φ0
)
,
and the compensating variations of age i = 22, . . . , I at the time of the policy change (t = 1) are calculated
as cv(si,S1; Ψ1,Φ1) such that
v(i, a− cv(si,S1; Ψ1,Φ1), b, e,S1; Ψ1,Φ1) = v
(
i, a, b, e,S0; Ψ0,Φ0
)
.










cv(i, a, b, e,S1; Ψ1,Φ1)dX1(si)× 1
pi,1
,
for t = 1, . . . ,∞ and i = 22, . . . , I .
3 Calibration
The current U.S. population is aging, that is, the population distribution is not stationary. So, a stationary
equilibrium in an overlapping-generations economy cannot, in general, describe an economy with the aging
population. This section, therefore, constructs the aging-population baseline economy as an equilibrium
transition path between 1975 and 2200 and calibrates the model to the 2014 U.S. economy such that the
model economy in 2014 (on the equilibrium transition path) is consistent with the 2014 U.S. economy in
terms of macroeconomic statistics and population distribution. Because the government’s fiscal policy is
not sustainable under the aging-population assumption, the baseline economy assumes that the government
cuts (or increases) its consumption so that the government’s debt-per capita stays at the same level after the
growth adjustment.16 Because the government’s consumption does not affect the household’s decision in
16In other words, the government’s debt per capita is assumed to grow at the same rate of the labor augmenting productivity
growth rate, µ. This assumption assures that the debt-to-GDP ratio stays constant in the long run.
14
this model economy, the aging baseline economy incorporates the effect of the demographic changes without
any feedback effects from the government’s fiscal policy changes. This paper calls the 2014 economy in the
aging baseline economy the benchmark economy and uses it as the benchmark for comparison in the policy
experiments.
3.1 Population Projection
This paper uses Social Security Administration’s population projections—alternative 2 (intermediate
scenario), alternative 1 (low-cost scenario), and alternative 3 (high-cost scenario)—provided for the 2014
trustees report. These population projections consist of the historical population by age and gender over
1941–2012 and the projected populations by age and gender over 2013–2100, but these projections show
the population of ages 100 and older as that of one age group (100+).
To incorporate SSA’s population projection to the model economy, this paper first imputes the population
distribution and mortality rates of ages 100–120 from the combined population of ages 100+. Let pˆji,t be the
population of age i and gender j in year t, and let qji be the mortality rate of age i and gender j in the 2010
period life table (Table 4.C6) in SSA (2015). Then, for i = 100, . . . , 120, j = 1 (male) and 2 (female), and






pˆji−1,t if t = 1941,(
1− ξjt−1qji−1
)
pˆji−1,t−1 if t > 1941,





Then, this paper obtains the population of age i in year t as pˆi,t = pˆ1i,t + pˆ
2
i,t for i = 100, . . . , 120 and t =
1941, . . . , 2100 and calculates the corresponding survival rate as φi,t = pˆi+1,t+1/pˆi,t for i = 99, . . . , 119
and t = 1941, . . . , 2099 with φ120,t = 0 for all t.
This paper next extrapolates the population and the survival rate by age beyond 2100. In this extrap-
olation, for simplicity, this paper keeps the survival rate by age at the same level beyond 2099, that is,
φi,t = φi,t−1 for i = 0, . . . , 120 and t = 2100, . . . , 2200. The paper also assumes the age-specific fertility
rates to be constant beyond 2100. More specifically, this paper estimates the population of age-0 (newborn)
15




























Source: Author’s calculations from the population projections for Social Security Administration (2014).




























where ζ2100 is the fertility rate adjustment factor for 2100 such that the above equation holds in 2100. The
age-specific fertility rates used in the above equation are those for 2008 in United Nations (2013).





− 1 = 0.003217 (alt. 2), 0.007321 (alt. 1), −0.001454 (alt. 3),







for i = 21, . . . , 120 and t = 1975, . . . , 2200.
Figure 1 shows the old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of households ages 65 and older to those ages
between 21 and 64) and the share of working age population (the share of households ages between 21 and
64 in those ages 21 and older) between 1980 and 2200. The old-age dependency ratio goes up from 0.244 in
2014 to 0.398 (0.375, 0.425) in 2039 and 0.476 (0.367, 0.628) in the long run under alternative 2 (alternative
16
1, alternative 3). The increase in this old-age dependency ratio explains the increase in the cost of the Social
Security program in the future. The share of working-age population in total adult population goes down
from 0.804 in 2014 to 0.715 (0.727, 0.702) in 2039 and 0.677 (0.731, 0.614) in the long run under alternative
2 (alternative 1, alternative 3). The declines in the share of working-age population explains the decreases
in the labor supply per capita and gross domestic output per capita in the future.
3.2 Calibration Strategy
Because the current U.S. population distribution is aging and thus not stationary, it is impossible to
construct the 2014 benchmark economy as a stationary equilibrium. So, this paper constructs the aging-
population baseline economy as an equilibrium transition path between 1975 and 2200 by the following
procedure.
1. This paper first solves the model for a stationary equilibrium with the population distribution in 1975,
where the households in the model economy falsely believe that the population distribution does not
change and the economy is stationary, although the model calculates aggregate variables by using the
non-stationary 1975 population distribution.
2. This paper next solves the model for a stationary equilibrium with the population distribution in 2200.
The population projection in 2200 is constructed to be stationary.17
3. This paper then solves the model for an equilibrium transition path between 1975 and 2200 using
one of population projections as well as historical population. The households in the model economy
realize, at the beginning of 1975, that the population distribution is not stationary, and they precisely
project the changes in fertility rates and mortality rates through 2200.
This paper repeats Step 1 through Step 3 to find a set of preference and policy parameters that make the
2014 model economy on the equilibrium transition path consistent with the 2014 U.S. economy in terms
macroeconomic and fiscal policy statistics. The current-law fiscal policy is not sustainable in the presence
of the aging population. Therefore, as explained above, this paper assumes that the government adjusts its
consumption to keep its government’s net worth per capita at the 2014 level after the productivity growth
adjustment.
Table 1 shows the values of main preference and technology parameters in the aging-population baseline
economy over 1975–2200 under SSA’s population projections alternative 2 (intermediate scenario), alterna-
17Because this paper keeps both the mortality rates and age-specific fertility rates constant after 2100, the population distribution
in 2200 is approximately stationary.
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Table 1: Main Parameter Values of the Aging-Population Baseline Economies
Parameter Alt. 2 Alt. 1 Alt. 3 Comment / Target
Demographics
Maximum age I 120 120 120
Maximum age households can work 80 80 80
Minimum age of elderly households IR 65 65 65 Medicare eligibility age
Productivity growth rate µ 0.0150 0.0150 0.0150 Real GDP per capita in 1989–2014
Long-run population growth rate ν 0.0032 0.0073 -0.0015 Population growth in 2200
Total population (ages 21–120) in 2014 51.307 51.307 51.307 When p21,t = 1.0 in 2014
Working-age population in 2014 41.241 41.241 41.241
Preferences
Discount factor β 1.0084 1.0087 1.0081 Kt/Yt = 2.92 in 2014
Growth-adjusted discount factor β˜ 0.9872 0.9875 0.9869 β˜ = β(1 + µ)α(1−γ)
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000
Share parameter of consumption α 0.7148 0.7150 0.7148 Frisch elasticity 0.5 in 2014
Production technology and wage process
Share parameter of capital stock θ 0.4100 0.4100 0.4100 Labor share 0.59 in 2010–2014
Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 0.0804 0.0804 0.0804 rt = 0.06 in 2014
Total factor productivity A 0.8798 0.8798 0.8798 wt = 1.0 in 2014
Auto correlation parameter of log wage ρ 0.9500 0.9500 0.9500
Standard deviation of log wage shocks σ 0.2600 0.2600 0.2600 Var. of log earnings in 2013 SCF
Average hourly wage by age e¯i Estimated by OLS with 2013 SCF
Note: This baseline calibration uses the population projections alternative 2 (intermediate scenario), alternative 1
(low-cost scenario), and alternative 3 (high-cost scenario) for Social Security Administration (2014).
tive 1 (low-cost scenario), and alternative 3 (high-cost scenario); and Table 2 (on page 24) shows the values
of the government policy parameters in the same three economies. The rest of this section explains the
parameters under the population projection alternative 2.
3.3 Demographics
The maximum possible age of households in the model economy, I , is 120. This paper calls households
of ages 21 to 64 working-age households, and households of ages IR = 65 and older elderly households,
even though they can possibly work until age 80. When this paper normalizes the population of age-21
households in 2014 to unity, the total population and the working-age population are 51.31 and 41.24,
respectively. For simplicity, the total population is that of ages 21 and older in this paper, and it excludes
the population of ages between 0 and 20. Households in the model economy are assumed to be a mixture of
married (50%) and single (50%) households.18 The labor-augmenting productivity growth rate, µ, is set at
1.5%, which is close to the average growth rate, 1.48%, of real GDP per capita over the past 25 years, 1989–
18According to Table 1 in Vespa, Lewis, and Kreider (2013), which is constructed from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 American
Community Survey, 48.3% of all households and 51.4% of households ages 25 to 64 are married households in 2011.
18





















Source: Author’s calculations from the population projections for Social Security Administration (2014).
2014. The long-run population growth rate, ν, is set at 0.3137% as explained above, although the population
grows faster in the short and medium run. Figure 2 shows the population growth rates in SSA’s projection
and the long-run population growth rate, ν, under the projection alternative 2 as well as the growth rates
under alternatives 1 and 3.
3.4 Preferences






which is consistent with a growth economy.19 The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, for the combi-
nation of consumption and leisure is set at 3.0, which is roughly in the middle of the range assumed in
macroeconomic public finance literature.20 The share parameter of consumption, α, is set at 0.7148 so that
the Frisch elasticity of working hours of the average household (a household whose working hours are the
average of those of all working-age households, h¯ = 0.6182) is 0.5 in the 2014 benchmark economy, where
19When the period utility function is additively separable, as in u(c, h) = f(c) − g(h), then the utility function is consistent
with a balanced-growth path—the average working hours are unchanged in a steady state even though productivity is rising—only
if f(c) is proportional to ln c.
20For example, Domeij and Heathcote (2004) use 1.0, I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Joines (1995) use 2.0, and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) use 4.0.
19






The discount factor, β, of households is set at 1.0084 so that the capital–output ratio in the 2014 benchmark
economy is equal to the ratio, 2.92, in 2014 in the national income and product account (NIPA) data. Then,
this paper obtains the growth-adjusted discount factor as
β˜ = β(1 + µ)α(1−γ) = 0.9872.
This paper assumes that the household’s minimum wealth level (≤ 0) depends only on its age, as a′ ≥
a′min(i, a, b, e) = amin(i+ 1), and
amin(i) =
 0 if i = 21 or I + 1,[ (1 + µ)amin(i+ 1)− 0.15w¯emin(i)hmax ]/(1 + r¯) if i = 22, . . . , I,
where emin(i) is the lowest working ability for age i, and where r¯, w¯, and h¯ are the interest rate, the wage
rate, and the average working hours, respectively, in the 2014 benchmark economy. One might expect
minimum assets to be set at what a household could repay under the worst possible realizations for working
ability. However, this paper multiplies labor income with the lowest working ability and average working
hours (repaying ability) by 0.15 to align household debt to the U.S. economy. According to the 2013
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Federal Reserve Board, 2014), 11.3% of households (ages 21-99)
have negative net worth with average net debt $32,292, and average debt per household is $3,659 . In the
2014 benchmark economy, 20.2% of households have negative wealth with average net debt $18,257, and
average debt per household is $3,688.
3.5 The Production Technology and the Wage Process
The production function of the representative firm is one of Cobb–Douglas,
Y = F (K,L) = AKθL1−θ.
The share parameter of capital stock, θ, is set equal to 0.41, which reflects 1 minus the average labor income
share, wtLt/Yt = 0.59, for 2009–2013 in the NIPA data. When the capital–output ratio, Kt/Yt, is 2.92,
the gross rate of return to capital is rt + δ = θYt/Kt = 0.41/2.92 = 0.1404 or 14.04%. The depreciation
20
rate of capita, δ, is set at 0.0804 so that the real rate of return to capital, rt, is 0.06 or 6.0% in the 2014
benchmark economy. Total factor productivity, A, is fixed at 0.8798 so that the average wage rate, wt, is
normalized to unity in the benchmark economy.
The working ability, ei, of an age i household in the model economy is assumed to satisfy
ln ei = ln e¯i + ln zi
for i = 21, . . . , 80, where wte¯i is the average wage rate of age i households in year t, and zi is the persistent
shock that follows an AR(1) process,
ln zi = ρ ln zi−1 + i
for i = 21, . . . , 80. The temporary shock, i, is normally distributed, i ∼ N(−12σ2, σ2), and the initial
distribution of the log-persistent shock satisfies ln z20 ∼ N(−12σ2ln z20 , σ2ln z20).
The average working ability, e¯i, for ages 21 to 80 is constructed from the 2013 SCF (Federal Reserve
Board, 2014). This paper first calculates the unconditional average hourly wage and the average hourly
wage given earnings are strictly positive for ages 21 to 80 in the 2013 SCF.21 Then, this paper estimates
the average hourly wage (working ability) by age by using ordinary least squares with the weighted average
of the unconditional and conditional average hourly wages. Thus, this paper implicitly assumes that some
households do not work because their working ability is very low, but other households, especially elderly
households, decide not to work even though their working ability is high. Figure 3 shows the average
hourly wages calculated from the 2013 SCF and the estimated (smoothed) average hourly wage in the model
economy. The average of e¯i for ages 21 to 64 is also normalized to unity in the model economy.
The autocorrelation parameter, ρ, of the log-persistent shock is set at 0.95, which is approximately in
the middle of the range in the previous literature.22 Given the initial variance, σ2ln z20 , the variance of log-
persistent shock, ln zi, is calculated recursively as
σ2ln zi = ρ
2σ2ln zi−1 + σ
2
for i = 21, . . . , 80. To align the wage process to the U.S. data, the standard deviation, σ, of the transitory
21To calculate the unconditional average hourly wage, this paper assumes that the hourly wage is zero when the household is
not working. So, the unconditional average is the lower bound of the average potential wage, whereas the conditional average is the
upper bound of the average potential wage.
22For example, Domeij and Heathcote (2004) use 0.90, Huggett (1996) uses 0.96, and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) use
0.98.
21
























Sources: Author’s calculations from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve Board, 2014).
shock, i, is set at 0.26, and the initial variance, σ2ln z20 , of the log-persistent shock is set at a fraction of its
limiting variance,
σ2ln z20 = 0.4 limi→∞
σ2ln zi = 0.4×
σ2
1− ρ2 = 0.4× 0.6933 = 0.2773.
The number 0.4 < 1 is chosen so that the variance of log earnings increases with the age of the household.
Figure 4 shows that the variances of log labor income calculated using the 2013 SCF (Federal Reserve
Board, 2014) and those in the 2014 benchmark economy are quite similar.23
This paper uses the Rouwenhorst method (Rouwenhorst, 1995) to discretize the log-persistent shock for
each age and construct the Markov transition matrix by age. The unconditional probability distribution of
the 7 nodes is
pii =
(
0.0156 0.0938 0.2344 0.3125 0.2344 0.0937 0.0156
)
for i = 21, . . . , 80, and the Markov transition matrix of an age i household, Πi = [pi(e
j′
i+1 | eji ) ], that
23Although the variance of log working ability, σ2ln zi , is assumed to strictly increase with age, the variance of log labor income
is not necessarily monotone in the model economy, because working hours are endogenous.
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Sources: Author’s calculations from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve Board, 2014).
corresponds to ρ = 0.95 is obtained as
Πi =

0.8591 0.1322 0.0085 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0220 0.8619 0.1103 0.0057 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
0.0006 0.0441 0.8636 0.0883 0.0034 0.0001 0.0000
0.0000 0.0017 0.0662 0.8642 0.0662 0.0017 0.0000
0.0000 0.0001 0.0034 0.0883 0.8636 0.0441 0.0006
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0057 0.1103 0.8619 0.0220
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0085 0.1322 0.8591

for i = 21, . . . , 79.
3.6 The Progressive Income Tax Function
According to Table 4.B1 in Social Security Administration (2015), total covered earnings—the tax base
of the HI payroll tax—are $7,147 billion in 2013, which are 42.6% of GDP and 72.2% of total labor income
in the same year. In this paper, therefore, the ratio of taxable labor income to total labor income, η, is set at
0.722. The average household labor income for ages 21 to 64 is $65,766 in the 2013 SCF (Federal Reserve
Board, 2014). Because labor income per capita increased by 3.3% in NIPA between 2013 and 2014, the
average labor income is estimated at $67,936 in 2014. In the units employed in the model economy, the
average labor income of households ages 21 to 64 is calculated as 0.6758 in the 2014 benchmark economy.
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Table 2: Fiscal Policy Parameter Values of the Aging-Population Baseline Economies
Parameter Alt. 2 Alt. 1 Alt. 3 Comment
Model units
Taxable labor income ratio η 0.7220 0.7220 0.7220 Covered earnings / labor income
Scale adjustmenta 139.196 139.250 139.109 Average earnings $67,936
Progressive income tax
Income tax: tax rate limit ϕt 0.3745 0.3750 0.3740 TI,t/Yt = 0.100
: curvature ϕ1 0.7525 0.7525 0.7525
}
Estimated by OLS: scale ϕ2 0.7368 0.7370 0.7364
: deduction/exemptionsb d 0.1094 0.1093 0.1094 0.5×$20,300 + 0.5×$10,150
Social Security system
S.S. payroll tax rate: OASI τO,t 0.1007 0.1007 0.1007 Revenue 3.70% of GDP
: DI τD,t 0.0171 0.0171 0.0172 Revenue 0.63% of GDP
: HI τH,t 0.0305 0.0305 0.0305 Revenue 1.32% of GDP
: HI surtax τHS,t 0.0090 0.0090 0.0090 Current-law rate
Maximum taxable earningsc ϑmax 1.0507 1.0503 1.0513 (0.5×1.5 + 0.5)$117,000
Repl. rate threshold: 0.90 & 0.32c ϑ1 0.0879 0.0879 0.0880 (0.5×1.5 + 0.5)$816×12
: 0.32 & 0.15c ϑ2 0.5299 0.5297 0.5302 (0.5×1.5 + 0.5)$4,917×12
HI surtax thresholdb ϑ3 1.6164 1.6158 1.6174 0.5×$250,000 + 0.5×$200,000
Benefit adjustment factor: OASI ψO,t 1.5776 1.5760 1.5788 Benefits 4.01% of GDP
: DI ψD,t 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 Benefits 0.84% of GDP
: HI ψH,t 0.0777 0.0777 0.0778 Benefits 1.56% of GDP
Other policy variables
Government’s consumption per capita cG,t 0.0342 0.0342 0.0343 Calculated as a residual
Lump-sum transfers per capita trLS,t 0.0727 0.0727 0.0728 Non-SS transfers 7.44% of GDP
Consumption tax rate τC,t 0.0246 0.0246 0.0246 TC,t/Yt = 0.016
Government’s net worth per capita wG,t 0.0293 0.0293 0.0293 WG,t/Yt = 0.03
Note: This baseline calibration uses the population projections alternative 2 (intermediate scenario), alternative 1
(low-cost scenario), and alternative 3 (high-cost scenario) for Social Security Administration (2014). a A unit in
the model economy corresponds to $139,196 ($139,250, $139,109) in 2014 growth-adjusted dollars. b 50% of all
households are assumed to be married, and the other 50% of households are single. c Each married household is
assumed to have 1.5 full-time equivalent workers.
Under this assumption, one model unit for an individual household corresponds to $67,936/(0.6758 ×
0.722) = $139,216 in 2014 growth-adjusted U.S. dollars. This scale factor converts some of the policy
variables under the current law into the model parameters.
The individual income tax function is one of Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
τI,t(wteh, rta, trSS,t(i, b)) = τ˜I,t(y) = ϕt
[
y − (y−ϕ1 + ϕ2)−1/ϕ1 ] ,
where
y = max {rta+ η wteh+ rta+ ζ(η wteh+ rta, trSS,t(i, b))− d, 0}
24





















Single Married Estimated Effective
Sources: Author’s calculations from the Internal Revenue Service (2015).
is the household’s taxable income with constant deductions and exemptions d, and ζ(·) calculates the taxable
portion of Social Security benefits.24
The first parameter, ϕt, of the Gouveia–Strauss function shows the limit of the effective marginal income
tax rate as taxable income goes to infinity. This paper initially sets this first parameter at 0.396 or 39.6%,
which is the marginal income tax rate for the highest tax bracket. Then, this paper estimates the other
two parameters, ϕ1 and ϕ2, by OLS with the 2014 statutory marginal tax rate schedule, assuming 50% of
households are married filing jointly and 50% of households are single. The second parameter, ϕ1 = 0.7525,
shows the curvature of the tax function; and the third parameter, ϕ2 = 0.7368, is used to adjust the scale of
the tax function.25 The federal income tax revenue, the sum of the individual income tax revenue and the
corporate income tax revenue, is 10.0% as a share of GDP in fiscal year 2014. So, this paper finally adjusts
the first parameter, ϕt, to 0.3745 so that the income tax revenue as a share of GDP is 10.0% in the 2014
benchmark economy. Figure 5 shows the marginal income tax rates under the current law and estimated by
using the Gouveia–Strauss function.
In 2014, the standard deduction is $6,200 for a single household and $12,400 for a married household
filing return jointly. In the same year, the exemption is $3,950 per person. When 50% of households are
assumed to be married and 50% are assumed to be single, the sum of the deduction and exemptions is,
on average, 0.5(12,400 + 7,900) + 0.5(6,200 + 3,950) = 15,225 in 2014 growth-adjusted dollars. The
24For the taxation on Social Security benefits, see Tables 2.A.31–32 in Social Security Administration (2014).
25This paper initially estimates the third parameter, ϕ2, as 0.017958 by using labor income in thousands of dollars, then the
paper rescales the Gouveia–Strauss tax function to model units as ϕ2 = 0.017958 × 139.196ϕ1 = 0.7368, where 139.196 is a
scale parameter explained above.
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parameter, d, is set at 15,225/139,196 = 0.1094 by converting the above number into model units.
3.7 The Social Security System
The Social Security OASDHI payroll tax function is
τP,t(wteh) = (τO,t + τD,t) min(η ·wteh, ϑmax) + τH,t η ·wteh+ τHS,t max(η ·wteh− ϑ3, 0),
where τO,t is the flat Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) tax rate, τD,t is the flat Disability Insurance
(DI) tax rate, τH,t is a flat Hospital Insurance (HI, Medicare Part A) tax rate, and τHS,t is a flat HI surtax
rate. These payroll tax rates include the portion of taxes paid by employers. The payroll tax revenues for
the OASI, DI, and HI programs are 3.70%, 0.63%, and 1.32%, respectively, as a share of GDP in 2013,
according to Tables 4.A1, 4.A2, and 8.A1 in Social Security Administration (2014). This paper sets τHS,t at
0.009, which is the statutory HI surtax rate. Then, this paper sets τO,t, τD,t, and τH,t at 0.1007, 0.0171, and
0.0305, respectively, so that the payroll tax revenues for the OASI, DI, and HI programs as a share of GDP
in the 2014 benchmark economy are consistent with the data in 2013.26
The maximum taxable earnings per worker for the OASDI payroll tax were $117,000 in 2014 (SSA,
2015). This paper assumes that 50% of households are married households, and each of those household
has 1.5 full-time equivalent workers. Thus, this paper sets the maximum taxable earnings, ϑmax, as the
weighted average of 1.5 (married households) and 1.0 (single households). In the 2014 benchmark economy,
the maximum taxable earnings for a household are at 1.0507 in model units, which correspond to (0.5 ×
1.5 + 0.5 × 1.0)$117,000 = $146,250 per household in 2014. The threshold for the HI surtax is currently
$250,000 for a married household and $200,000 for a single household. In the benchmark economy, the
surtax threshold, ϑ3, is at 1.6164 in model units, which corresponds to 0.5× $250,000 + 0.5× $200,000 =
$225,000 per household in 2014.
The Social Security OASDHI benefit function is




0.90 min(b, ϑ1) + 0.32 max [ min(b, ϑ2)− ϑ1, 0 ]
+ 0.15 max(b− ϑ2, 0)
}
+ 1{i<IR˜}ψD,t ·κD,i + 1{i≥IR}ψH,t ·κH,i,
26When labor income is below the maximum taxable earnings, the statutory OASI tax rate is 10.6%, including 5.3% paid by
employers. The effective OASI tax rate is, therefore, 0.106/1.053 = 0.1007 or 10.07%, which is almost equal to the effective
OASI tax rate in the 2014 benchmark economy. The statutory DI and HI tax rates are 1.8% and 2.9%, respectively. The effective
HI tax rate in the benchmark economy is higher than the statutory rate because the model cannot capture the revenue from the HI
surtax for high-income workers perfectly.
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Sources: Author’s calculations from the Social Security Administration (2015).
where IR˜ is the full retirement age and set between ages 65 and 67 in two-month increments, depending on
the household’s birth year;27 IR is the Medicare eligibility age (age 65); ϑ1 and ϑ2 are the thresholds for
the three replacement rate brackets, 90%, 32%, and 15%, that calculate the OASI benefit from the average
historical earnings; ψO,t is the adjustment factor of the OASI benefits; κD,i is the ratio of the DI eligibility
rate for age i to the average DI eligibility rate; ψD,t is the average DI benefit in year t; κH,i is the ratio of
the average HI benefit (cost) for age i to the average HI benefit for all beneficiaries; and ψH,t is the average
HI benefit in year t.
The current U.S. Social Security system determines the thresholds to calculate primary insurance amounts
for each age cohort when a worker reaches age 62. This paper fixes the growth-adjusted thresholds at the
same level for all age cohorts and adjusts the PIA later by using the long-term productivity growth rate and
years after age 60. Thus, the model simply uses the thresholds for the age 62 cohort in 2014 after scale
adjustment.28 Figure 6 shows the share of DI beneficiaries by age and the ratio of the DI eligibility rate by
age to the overall average DI eligibility rate (the likelihood of receiving DI benefits by age). This paper es-
timates the latter, κD,i, by OLS to the distribution of DI benefits by age. Figure 7 shows the average cost of
HI benefits by age in 2011, estimated by Numan, Cubanski, and Damico (2015). This paper also estimates
the average HI benefit by age by OLS and calculates κH,i as the ratio of the average HI benefit by age to the
27As explained in Section 2, households are assumed to start claiming their OASI benefits at their full retirement age (FRA),
IR˜, although they can continue working if they like.
28Under the current system, AIMEs for those ages 60 and older are not wage-indexed but price-indexed, and the bracket thresh-
olds are also price-indexed for each age cohort. To simplify the computation in the growth economy, the model first assumes all
of the above variables are wage-indexed. Then, the model converts the Social Security benefits to be price-indexed by dividing the
benefits by (1 + µ)i−60.
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Source: Numan, Cubanski, and Damico (2015).
overall average HI benefit.
The benefit expenditures for the OASI, DI, and HI programs are 4.01%, 0.84%, and 1.56%, respectively,
as a share of GDP in 2013, according to Tables 4.A1, 4.A2, and 8.A1 in Social Security Administration
(2014). This paper, therfore, sets ψO,t, ψD,t, and ψH,t at 1.5779, 0.0104, and 0.0846, respectively, so that
the benefit expenditures for the OASI, DI, and HI programs as a share of GDP in the 2014 benchmark
economy are consistent with the data in 2013.29
3.8 The Other Policy Variables
The government’s (beginning-of-year) debt held by the public is 70.9% as a share of GDP in 2014,
according to the Treasury Department and NIPA. The government’s (beginning-of-year) capital stock is
74.0% as a share of GDP in the same year, according to NIPA. This paper, for simplicity, assumes that
the government’s capital stock and debt held by the public cancel out to each other, and the model uses the
government’s net worth per household, wG,t, as one of its policy variables. In the 2014 benchmark economy,
the government’s (beginning-of-year) net worth is assumed to be 3.0% of GDP.
The government’s non-Social Security (OASDHI) transfer spending is 7.44% as a share of GDP in 2013,
according to NIPA and Social Security Administration (2015). In the 2014 benchmark economy, lump-sum
transfers per household, trLS,t, is assumed to be 7.44% of GDP. The government’s consumption spending
29There is no disability risk or health risk in the model economy, for simplicity. DI benefits and HI benefits are age dependent
but uniformly distributed for each age. So, the model implicitly assumes that the government transfers the actuarially-fair insurance
premiums for DI and HI, rather than realized insurance benefits, to those households.
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is 5.7% as a share of GDP in 2013, according to NIPA. In the 2014 benchmark economy, however, it is
calculated as a residual for each year so that the government’s net worth (capital stock net of debt) per
household stays at the same level after the productivity-growth adjustment. So, it is assumed to be 3.5%
of GDP in the 2014 benchmark economy, which is smaller than 5.7% in NIPA.30 The rate of the national
consumption tax, which approximates the excise tax and other taxes, is set at τC,t = 0.0246 or 2.46% so
that the consumption tax revenue is 1.6% of GDP in the 2014 benchmark economy.
4 The Aging Baseline Economies
This section shows the aging-population baseline economies with SSA’s population projections Alter-
native 2 (intermediate scenario) as well as Alternatives 1 (low-cost scenario) and 3 (high-cost scenario).
These baseline economies assume that the government cut its consumption spending to keep its growth-
adjusted net worth per household at the same level. In this paper, therefore, these economies do not consider
any feedbacks effects of the government’s policy changes on individual behaviors and the overall economy.
This section also explains the fiscal gaps in the three aging-population baseline economies. The fiscal gap
shows how much the government will have to reduce its primary deficits in the future, relative to the deficits
under the current-law fiscal policies, in order to make the government budget sustainable.
4.1 The Aging-Population Baseline Relative to the 2014 Benchmark Economy
Figure 8 shows the aging-population baseline economy for the years from 1980 to 2200. Each panel
of the figure shows the changes from the 2014 benchmark economy, which year is indicated by the vertical
line in each panel. In other words, the horizontal line at 0.0 indicates the balanced growth path that goes
through the 2014 economy in the absence of the aging population; and each panel shows the effect of the
aging population (demographic changes) under the current-law (2014 benchmark) fiscal policies.
According to the model, if fiscal policies had been unchanged at the 2014 benchmark levels, labor supply
per capita would have increased since the mid-1980s and peaked around 2006–2007. The years from 1980
to 2006 coincide with the period when the baby boomers had a central role in the U.S. labor market. The
baby boomers started retiring in 2008, and the proportion of working-age households and labor supply per
capita would have declined since then and will continue declining over time.31 This is the direct effect of the
30In other words, there is a fiscal gap as large as 2.2% of GDP in 2014 before assuming any demographic changes in the future.
For simplicity, however, this paper only considers the fiscal gap caused by the projected aging population, which is around 3.0%
of GDP under the population projection alternative 2. This existing fiscal gap, 2.2%, is relatively large partly because the model
assumes that the government’s capital stock and its debt change in parallel so that its net worth stays at the same level.
31In this paper, percent changes in labor supply per capita are equal to percent changes in labor supply per household but not
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aging population on the U.S. economy. Labor supply per capita will be 8.1% (7.2%, 9.0%) lower in 2039
and 11.9% (7.6%, 17.5%) lower in the long run under Alternative 2 (Alternative 1, Alternative 3) relative to
the economy without the aging population (the 2014 benchmark economy).
It is, in general, difficult to predict the economy’s capital stock, because it depends not only on the
households’ saving decision but also on the government’s debt in the future. In this paper, however, the
government’s net worth per capita is kept constant, after the productivity-growth adjustment, at the 2014
benchmark level. If the government cuts its consumption spending—in other words, if no additional bud-
getary feedbacks to the household’s budget are considered—capital stock per capita will be 1.5% (2.7%,
0.0%) lower in 2039 and 0.1% (–2.7%, 1.7%) higher in the long run relative to the 2014 benchmark econ-
omy. The capital stock will increase in the long run, under Alternatives 2 and 3, because the households will
have to accumulate larger wealth for their retirement if life expectancy is higher and the government’s fiscal
policies are not changed.
In the aging baseline economy, other things being equal, GDP per capita would have increased since the
early-1980s and peaked around 2010; then, it will likely decrease over time. The potential GDP per capita
growth rate would have been higher than the long-run productivity growth rate until 2010 and will be lower
than the long-run rate,at least, until the mid-2040s, because of the change in the share of the working-age
households. GDP per capita will be 5.4% (5.4%, 5.4%) lower in 2039 and 7.2% (5.6%, 10.1%) lower in
the long run with the aging population if the budgetary costs of aging are financed by cuts in government
consumption.
Because of the decrease in labor supply per capita and GDP per capita, the disposable income of house-
holds will also decrease, on average, by 2.0% (2.2%, 1.8%) in 2039 and 2.3% (2.4%, 2.9%)in the long run.
However, the private saving rate will also decrease, on average, by 2.6 (2.5, 2.7) percentage points in 2039
and 3.4 (1.9, 5.2) percentage points in the long run. In the aging baseline economy, capital stock per capita
will increase slightly in the long run, although the household’s average saving rate falls. This is because
the the private saving rate is above its steady-state level in the 2014 benchmark economy, and it gradually
decreases to the steady-state level in the long run. Private consumption per capita, therefore, will increase
modestly by 0.9% (0.6%, 1.1%) in 2039 and 1.4% (–0.3%, 2.7%) in the long run.
Though capital stock per capita will stay around the 2014 benchmark level after productivity-growth
adjustment, labor supply per capita will decrease significantly. Thus, the rate of return to capital will fall
gradually by 0.56% (0.39%, 0.76%) in 2039 and 1.02% (0.43%, 1.63%) in the long run, and the average
wage rate will increase by 2.9% (2.0%, 3.9%) in 2039 and 5.4% (2.2%, 9.0%) in the long run.
equal to percent changes in labor supply per worker or working-age household. Labor supply per working-age household will
increase as households expect to live longer in the aging baseline economy.
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The aging population will significantly affect the government budget in the future. If the government’s
fiscal policy is unchanged, except for the size of the government consumption that, by assumption, does not
affect the households’ behavior, the government’s Social Security (OASDHI) benefit expenditure will grow
rapidly by 2.5% (2.2%, 3.0%) as a share of GDP in 2039 and by 4.1% (2.2%, 6.3%) as a share of GDP in
the long run. To make things worse, the government’s revenue from taxes (the income tax, the payroll tax,
and the consumption tax) will decrease by 1.1% (1.0%, 1.1%) as a share of GDP in 2039 and 1.4% (1.1%,
2.0%) as a share of GDP in the long run.
In the aging-population baseline economy, accordingly, the government will have to decrease its con-
sumption spending as a share of GDP by 3.6 (3.2, 4.1) percentage points in 2039 and by 5.5 (3.3, 8.4)
percentage points in the long run. It is obviously unrealistic to assume that the government will be able to
cut its consumption by these percentage points, as the government’s consumption is 5.7% of GDP in 2013
and 3.5% of GDP in the 2014 benchmark economy. In Section 5, therefore, this paper introduces alternative
fiscal policy changes—raising taxes or cutting Social Security benefits—to the aging-population baseline
economy and analyzes the overall effect of the aging population on the economy.
4.2 The Fiscal Gaps of the Current Government Policies
The fiscal gap of the government’s current-law fiscal policies is the present discount sum of the govern-
ment’s primary deficits from the present year through the infinite future. Economists often show the fiscal
gap as a percentage of the present discount sum of GDP over the same period. Table 3 shows the fiscal
gaps—total and by the government’s program—under SSA’s population projections Alternative 2, Alterna-
tive 1, and Alternative 3. When the model uses the realized real interest rate, rt, over the transition path, the
total fiscal gap in the aging-population baseline economy is 2.94% (2.31%, 3.80%) as a share of GDP under
Alternative 2 (Alternative 1, Alternative 3). This number 2.94% indicates that the government will have to
reduce its primary deficits by 2.94% of GDP every year from the present year (2014) through the infinite
future in order to make the policy sustainable.32 The fiscal gap of the Social Security (OASDHI) programs is
3.14% (2.55%, 3.92%) as a share of GDP, and the fiscal gap of the rest of the government budget is –0.20%
(–0.24%. -0.12%). In this paper, the fiscal gap of the rest of the government is negative because the model
constructs the government’s fiscal policies in the 2014 benchmark economy to be sustainable in the absence
of the aging population.
In the aging-population baseline economies, when the government’s growth-adjusted consumption per
32In 2014, the government’s income tax revenue is about 10.0% of GDP, and the Social Security payroll tax revenue is 5.65%
of GDP. Cutting primary deficits every year by 2.94% of GDP is not an easy policy change for the government, and it will generate
significant effects on individual households and the overall economy, which will be discussed in Section 5.
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Table 3: The Fiscal Gap in the Aging-Population Baseline Economies
GDP Total Social Security Rest of the
Total OASI DI HI government
Alternative 2 (intermediate)
Discount rate = rt
Present discount value 1457.5 42.88 45.82 27.13 2.98 15.71 -2.94
Fiscal gap (%GDP) 2.94 3.14 1.86 0.20 1.08 -0.20
Discount rate = 6.0%
Present discount value 1278.9 34.57 37.65 22.22 2.63 12.80 -3.08
Fiscal gap (%GDP) 2.70 2.94 1.74 0.21 1.00 -0.24
Alternative 1 (low-cost)
Discount rate = rt
Present discount value 1428.0 32.99 36.44 21.16 2.91 12.37 -3.45
Fiscal gap (%GDP) 2.31 2.55 1.48 0.20 0.87 -0.24
Discount rate = 6.0%
Present discount value 1319.0 29.58 32.96 19.14 2.70 11.13 -3.39
Fiscal gap (%GDP) 2.24 2.50 1.45 0.20 0.84 -0.26
Alternative 3 (high-cost)
Discount rate = rt
Present discount value 1491.3 56.66 58.48 35.08 3.07 20.33 -1.82
Fiscal gap (%GDP) 3.80 3.92 2.35 0.21 1.36 -0.12
Discount rate = 6.0%
Present discount value 1240.0 39.76 42.39 25.28 2.57 14.54 -2.63
Fiscal gap (%GDP) 3.21 3.42 2.04 0.21 1.17 -0.21
Note: The present discount values are in model units as of the beginning of 2014.
household is fixed at the 2014 level, the primary deficits as a share of GDP will increase over time. Therefore,
the fiscal gap measure is sensitive to the choice of the discount rate to calculate the present discount values.
If the discount rate is fixed at the real interest rate, 6.0%, in the 2014 benchmark economy, the fiscal gap
will be smaller. The total fiscal gap in the aging-population baseline economy is 2.70% (2.24%, 3.21%) as
a share of GDP under Alternative 2 (Alternative 1, Alternative 3).
5 Financing the Aging Population
Section 4 calibrates the model to the U.S. economy with the aging population. The projected aging
population will affect individual households through the changes in their mortality rates and factor prices
in the economy; the overall economy (per household) through the decrease in the share of the working-age
households as well as the population growth rate; and the government budget through the decrease in tax
revenue and the increase in Social Security benefit spending. In the aging-population baseline economy,
however, the government is assumed to balance its budget, thus stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, by cutting
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government consumption without affecting the rest of the economy. In this model economy, the government
consumption is not in the household’s utility function or its budget constraint. Therefore, the aging baseline
economy shows the effect of the demographic changes projected in the United States without considering
its budgetary feedback (the effect from the government’s future policy changes).
This section, more realistically, assumes that the government keeps its consumption spending per house-
hold between 2014 and 2200 at the 2014 benchmark level instead of cutting it to balance the budget (See
Figure 9). This assumption creates a fiscal imbalance each year in 2014–2200 or, equivalently, creates a
fiscal gap in the current fiscal policy. The government then introduces an alternative fiscal policy to close
this fiscal gap and make the fiscal policy sustainable. The alternative fiscal policies introduced in this section
are
• increasing lump-sum taxes uniformly,
• raising progressive income tax rates proportionally,
• raising the flat consumption tax rate,
• cutting Social Security (OASI, DI, HI) benefits proportionally, and
• raising Social Security (OASI, DI, HI) payroll tax rates proportionally,
• cutting S.S. benefits and raising payroll tax rates proportionally,
to keep the government’s net worth per household at the 2014 level after the growth adjustment.33 Under
33Increasing lump-sum taxes uniformly is equivalent to decreasing lump-sum transfers uniformly in the model economy. This is
the least redistributive policy change, whereas raising progressive income tax rates proportionally is the most redistributive policy
change, among the above six policy changes.
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each of the above policy assumptions, this paper solves the model with the aging population for an equilib-
rium transition path in 2014–2200. Thus, each policy experiment shows the effect of the aging population
on the economy with the additional budgetary feedback through a specific policy change to close the fiscal
gap.
5.1 Increasing the Lump-Sum Tax, Income Tax, or Consumption Tax
This section introduces three broad fiscal policy changes—increasing lump-sum taxes uniformly, raising
marginal income tax rates proportionally, and raising the flat consumption tax rate—one by one, to show the
effects of tax increase policies. Figure 10 shows the macroeconomic and budgetary effects of these policy
changes, and Figure 11 shows the welfare effect of the same policy changes. For easier comparison, the
figures also include the results in the aging-population baseline economy, where the government cuts its
consumption each year to close the fiscal gap caused by the demographic changes.
5.1.1 Increasing Lump-Sum Taxes Uniformly
Blue dashed lines in Figure 10 show the results when the government closes the fiscal gap by increasing
lump-sum taxes uniformly instead of cutting its consumption as in the aging baseline economy. Increasing
lump-sum taxes uniformly will reduce the household’s consumption, especially when their income is low
or they are retired. Therefore, relative to the aging baseline economy, the households will work longer and
increase their precautionary and life cycle savings. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy, labor supply
per capita will decrease by 6.4% in 2039 and 9.5% in the long run (8.1% and 11.9%, respectively, in the
aging baseline). Capital stock per capita will increase by 3.3% in 2039 and 4.6% in the long run (–1.5%
and 0.1%, respectively, in the aging baseline). Accordingly, GDP per capita will decrease by 2.5% in 2039
and 4.0% in the long run (5.4% and 7.2%, respectively, in the aging baseline). Thus, increasing lump-sum
taxes uniformly attenuates the negative effect of the aging population on the overall economy by forcing
households to work longer and save more.
To close the fiscal gap, under this assumption, the government will have to increase lump-sum taxes by
3.3% as a share of the benchmark GDP in 2039 and 5.2% in the long run. This policy change will reduce the
household’s disposable income and their consumption. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy, private
consumption per capita will decrease by 2.0% in 2039 and 4.1% in the long run (increase by 0.9% and 1.4%,
respectively, in the aging baseline).
Blue dashed lines in Figure 11 show the welfare changes by age cohort after the policy change in 2014.
The horizontal axis shows the age of households when the policy is changed (in 2014), and the vertical axis
35





































































































































































































































































































































shows the welfare gains (losses if negative) relative to the aging baseline economy. The additional vertical
line is set at age 21. The left of this line shows the current households in 2014 and the right of the vertical
line shows the future generations. The first graph shows the welfare changes in the consumption equivalence
measure described in Section 2.5.1, and the second graph shows the welfare changes in the compensating
variation measure described in 2.5.2.34 Not surprisingly, cutting transfer spending will decrease the house-
hold’s average consumption and leisure hours, thus the policy change will make almost all age cohorts, on
average, worse off. What might be surprising is that, for almost all age cohorts, their welfare loss is the
biggest (worst) of the three alternative policy changes (tax increases) discussed in this section, although its
effect on the overall economy is the best of the three policy changes. This is because increasing lump-sum
taxes uniformly hurts low-income households most.
5.1.2 Raising Marginal Income Tax Rates Proportionally
Red long-dashed lines in Figure 10 show the results when the government closes the fiscal gap by
raising marginal income tax rates proportionally instead of cutting its consumption as in the aging baseline
economy. Raising marginal income tax rates proportionally will reduce the household’s labor supply, relative
to the aging baseline economy, as the substitution effect of the tax rate change is larger than the income effect
of the tax payment increase. The policy change will also decrease the household’s saving. Relative to the
2014 benchmark economy, labor supply per capita will decrease by 10.7% in 2039 and 18.8% in the long
run. Capital stock per capita will decrease by 9.0% in 2039 and 34.8% in the long run. The negative
34In Figures 11 and 14, the sign of compensating variations (in one-time wealth transfer) is reversed so that positive (negative)
values show welfare gains (losses).
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effect of the policy change on capital stock is especially large because the policy change hits high-income
households, who have the highest saving rate, most severely. Accordingly, GDP per capita will decrease by
10.0% in 2039 and 25.8% in the long run. Thus, closing the entire fiscal gap by increasing marginal income
tax rates proportionally intensifies the negative effect of the aging population on the overall economy by
forcing households work less and save less.
To close the fiscal gap, under this assumption, the government will have to raise marginal income tax
rates proportionally by 52.1% in 2039 and 120.5% in the long run.35 This policy change will decrease the
household’s disposable income and consumption significantly. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy,
private consumption per capita will decrease by 5.7% in 2039 and 20.1% in the long run. Red long-dashed
lines in Figure 11 show the welfare changes by age cohort. Not surprisingly, again, raising marginal income
tax rates will decrease the household’s average consumption significantly, thus the policy change will make
most age cohorts, excluding very old households at the time of the policy change, on average worse off. What
might be surprising is that, for the current and near-future households, their welfare loss is the smallest of the
three policy changes (tax increases) discussed in this section, even though its effect on the overall economy
is by far the worst of the three. This is because raising marginal income tax rates proportionally does not hurt
low-income and retired households very much and keeps the risk-sharing effect of the current government
policy.
5.1.3 Raising the Flat Consumption Tax Rate
Green dot-dash lines in Figure 10 show the results when the government closes the fiscal gap by raising
the flat consumption tax rate instead of cutting its consumption as in the aging baseline economy. Raising the
flat consumption tax rate will be close to neutral to the household’s labor supply and saving. If the govern-
ment increased the consumption tax rate permanently without preannouncement, the purchasing power of
the current and future labor income as well as the current wealth would decrease by the same rate. When the
elasticity of intra-temporal substitution between consumption and leisure is unity, as in the Cobb-Douglas
utility function, the income/wealth effect of the permanent increase in the consumption tax rate is as large
as its substitution effect. Thus, under this assumption, the household’s labor supply and saving would not
change at all. In this policy experiment, however, the flat consumption tax rate increases gradually as the
demographic changes progress. This predicted increase in the consumption tax rate generates a modest sub-
stitution effect and increases the household’s labor supply and saving slightly in the short run. Relative to
35This means that, the marginal tax rate of 15% in 2014 will have to increase to 22.8% in 2039 and 33.1% in the long run, and
the tax rate of 35% will be 53.2% in 2039 and 77.2% in the long run.
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the 2014 benchmark economy, labor supply per capita will decrease by 8.0% in 2039 and 11.9% in the long
run. Capital stock per capita will increase by 0.4% in 2039 and 0.1% in the long run. Accordingly, GDP per
capita will decrease by 4.6% in 2039 and 7.2% in the long run. Thus, closing the fiscal gap by raising the
flat consumption tax rate generates the similar macroeconomic effect to the aging baseline economy where
the government cuts its consumption instead.
To close the fiscal gap, the government will have to raise the consumption tax rate by 5.8 percentage
points in 2039 and 9.3 percentage points in the long run. This policy change will decrease the household’s
purchasing power (real disposable income) and consumption. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy,
private consumption per capita (before tax) will decrease by 3.9% in 2039 and 7.3% in the long run. Green
dot-dash lines in Figure 11 show the welfare changes by age cohort. Again, raising the flat consumption tax
rate will decrease the household’s average consumption significantly, thus the policy change will make all
age cohorts worse off. The welfare losses are between the previous two policy changes for the current and
near-future households but the smallest (best) for households in the long run of the three policy changes (tax
increases) discussed in this section.
5.2 Social Security Benefits and Payroll Taxes
This section introduces three policy changes in the Social Security program—cutting Social Security
(OASI, DI, HI) benefits proportionally, raising Social Security (OASI, DI, HI) payroll taxes proportionally,
and the combination of the above two policy changes—to show the effects of stylized Social Security re-
form plans. More precisely, the government adjusts the benefits or the tax rates or both of OASI, DI, and
HI programs independently to balance the budgets of these three programs balance each year. Then, the
government adjusts the flat consumption tax rate to balance the rest of the government budget each year.36
In the 2014 benchmark economy, the Social Security (OASDHI) budget is imbalanced with deficits. This
is because the model abstracts from the OASI and DI trust funds and interest incomes, which would have
been the government’s revenue had it not been the primary deficits in the Social Security budget. In these
policy experiments, when the Social Security budget is balanced, the government can reduce the consump-
tion tax rate to balance the rest of the budget each year. Figures 12 and 13 show the macroeconomic and
budgetary effects of these two policy changes, and Figure 14 shows the welfare effect of the same policy
changes. Again, the first two figures include the results in the aging-population baseline economy for easier
comparison.
36This paper assumes to change the consumption tax rate to balance the rest of the government budget because, as the previous
section shows, the macroeconomic effect of the change in the consumption tax is modest relative to the other tax policy changes.
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5.2.1 Cutting Social Security Benefits Proportionally
Blue dashed lines in Figures 12 and 13 show the macroeconomic effects when the government closes
the fiscal gap by cutting Social Security (OASI, DI, HI) benefits proportionally to balance each of the three
budgets and adjusting the consumption tax rate to balance the rest of the government budget. Cutting Social
Security benefits will generate a very large effect on the household’s life cycle saving for their retirement
and a modest effect on their precautionary saving. To accumulate higher wealth before retirement, relative to
the aging baseline economy, the household will work longer and increase their life cycle and precautionary
savings. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy, labor supply per capita will decrease by 5.9% in 2039
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and 9.2% in the long run. Capital stock per capita will increase by 13.7% in 2039 and 23.6% in the long
run. Accordingly, GDP per capita will increase by 1.7% in 2039 and 3.1% in the long run. Thus, closing the
fiscal gap by cutting Social Security benefits actually increases the output and capital stock per capita in the
economy despite that labor supply per capita decreases because of the demographic change.
To balance the Social Security budget, under this assumption, the government will have to cut the OASI
replacement rates proportionally by 35.4% in 2039 and 46.2% in the long run, the DI benefits by 18.2%
in 2039 and 16.8% in the long run, and the HI benefits by 46.3% in 2039 and 56.0% in the long run. To
balance the rest of the government budget, however, the government will be able to reduce the consumption
tax rate modestly by 0.5 percentage points in 2039 and 0.2 percentage points in the long run. Cutting Social
Security benefits will decrease the household’s disposable income and consumption significantly. Relative
to the 2014 benchmark economy, private consumption per capita will decrease, on average, by 1.3% in 2039
and 1.7% in the long run. Blue dashed lines in Figure 14 show the welfare changes by age cohort under
this assumption. Cutting Social Security benefits will hurt the current elderly and working-age households,
especially those near the retirement age, seriously. In the consumption equivalence measure, households
age 67 at the time of the policy change will be worse off, on average, by 14.7% of their (rest of the) lifetime
consumption. In the compensating variations measure, households age 61 at the time of the policy change
will suffer the welfare loss equivalent to one-time wealth loss of 195% of GDP per capita. Because of that,
cutting Social Security benefits will be politically difficult to introduce, although this policy change will
generate strong positive effects on the economy and will be least harmful for most future age cohorts of all
five financing assumptions in this paper.
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5.2.2 Raising Social Security Payroll Taxes Proportionally
Red long-dashed lines in Figures 12 and 13 show the macroeconomic effects when the government
closes the fiscal gap by increasing Social Security (OASI, DI, HI) payroll tax rates proportionally to balance
each of the three budgets and adjusting the consumption tax rate to balance the rest of the government budget.
Raising Social Security payroll tax rates will generate a similar effect on the household’s labor supply to that
of increasing marginal income tax rates. Since payroll tax rates are flat rather than progressive, however,
raising these tax rates will not decrease the overall labor supply as much as increasing marginal income tax
rates proportionally. As there is no change in the tax rate on capital income, raising payroll tax rates will
not also discourage the household’s saving by itself. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy, labor supply
per capita will decrease by 9.4% in 2039 and 14.0% in the long run. Capital stock per capita will decrease
by 4.0% in 2039 and 11.8% in the long run. Accordingly, GDP per capita will decrease by 7.2% in 2039
and 13.1% in the long run. Thus, closing the fiscal gap primarily by raising Social Security payroll tax
rates exacerbates the negative effect of the aging population on the overall economy, but this policy is less
harmful than closing the fiscal gap solely by increasing marginal income tax rates.
To balance the Social Security budget, under this assumption, the government will have to raise the
OASI payroll tax rate (below the maximum taxable earnings) by 66.7% in 2039 and 99.8% in the long run,
the DI payroll tax rate by 32.7% in 2039 and 39.3% in the long run, and the HI payroll tax rate by 106.6%
in 2039 and 174.1% in the long run. To balance the rest of the government budget, the government will also
have to raise the consumption tax rate by 0.4 percentage points in 2039 and 1.6 percentage points in the long
run. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy, private consumption per capita will decrease, on average, by
4.8% in 2039 and 10.9% in the long run. Red long-dashed lines in Figure 14 show the welfare changes by
age cohort under this assumption. Raising Social Security payroll tax rates will hurt all age cohorts except
for the elderly households at the time of the policy change. The welfare loss by age cohort is similar to that
when the government increases marginal income tax rates. Therefore, most current households prefer raising
Social Security payroll tax rates to other stylized policy changes discussed in this section. However, this
policy change will affect the macro economy significantly and hit future households most severely among
all policy changes.
5.2.3 Cutting S.S. Benefits and raising Payroll Taxes Proportionally
Green dot-dash lines in Figures 12 and 13 show the macroeconomic effects of the combination of the
above two Social Security policy changes. This paper assumes that about 50% of Social Security deficits
are financed by cutting benefits and the remaining Social Security deficits are financed by raising payroll
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taxes.37 Not surprisingly, the policy effects of this policy change are about in the middle of the previous two
policy changes. Relative to the 2014 benchmark economy, labor supply per capita will decrease by 7.6% in
2039 and 11.4% in the long run. Capital stock per capita will increase by 4.4% in 2039 and 4.5% in the long
run. Accordingly, GDP per capita will decrease by 2.8% in 2039 and 5.2% in the long run. In terms of total
output, cutting Social Security benefits and raising payroll taxes, roughly on the 50-50 basis, will generate
better results relative to cutting government consumption as in the aging baseline economy.
To balance the Social Security budget, under this assumption, the government will have to cut the OASI
replacement rates by 18.7% (24.0%) in 2039 (in the long run), cut the DI benefits by 10.6% (11.2%), cut the
HI benefits by 24.1% (30.6%), raise the OASI payroll tax rate by 30.5% (46.3%), raise the DI payroll tax
rate by 13.8% (14.6%), and raise the HI payroll tax rate by 49.2% (73.4%). Relative to the 2014 benchmark
economy, private consumption per capita will decrease, on average, by 2.9% in 2039 and 6.0% in the long
run. Green dot-dash lines in Figure 14 show the welfare changes by age cohort under this assumption.
The combination of cutting Social Security benefits and raising payroll taxes will distribute the pains from
closing the fiscal gap relatively equally between the current households and the future households. So,
considering both the effects on the macro economy (efficiency) and the welfare changes by age (generational
equity), this policy change would be one of the most acceptable policy changes.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper incorporates historical and projected demographic changes, provided by the U.S. Social Se-
curity Administration, to a heterogeneous-agent OLG model with uninsurable wage and mortality shocks.
The paper analyzes the general-equilibrium effects of the aging population on the behavior and well-being
of heterogeneous households, the government’s budget, and the aggregate economy over 2014–2200. The
projected improvement in longevity will make working-age households work longer and save more to pre-
pare for their retirement. However, the decreasing share of the working-age households will significantly
decrease the aggregate labor supply and GDP relative to the benchmark economy without the aging pop-
ulation. These changes in macroeconomic variables will also decrease the government’s tax revenue and
increase its transfer spending. Thus, the aging population will make the current-law fiscal policy unsustain-
able and force the government to change its policy eventually.
This paper has two main contributions to the literature. First, this paper incorporates the SSA’s popu-
37Both cutting Social Security benefits and raising payroll taxes will affect the household’s behavior and thus the Social Security
budget further. the government cannot change the benefit schedules and the payroll tax rates so that the contribution of each policy
change to the budget will be exactly 50% of the total contribution.
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lation projections directly to a general-equilibrium OLG model so that the model can capture the effects of
retiring the current baby-boom generation, declining mortality rates, and stable but relatively low fertility
rates at the same time. Second, this paper uses a heterogeneous-agent OLG model with idiosyncratic wage
shocks and mortality shocks so that the model can appropriately replicate the government’s fiscal policy
tools—the progressive income tax and the progressive Social Security system—and analyze the policy ef-
fects through inter-generational and intra-generational income redistribution and risk sharing. One of the
difficulties to incorporate historical and projected population distributions to a heterogeneous-agent OLG
model is that the current population distribution is not stationary and, thus, a stationary equilibrium cannot
describe the current economy. To deal with this problem, this paper creates the 2014 benchmark economy
by solving the model for an equilibrium transition path between 1975 and 2200.
This paper then introduces six stylized fiscal policy changes to finance the budgetary cost of the aging
population in the future. This paper intentionally chooses simple stylized policy changes to emphasize to
what extent the effect of the aging population will differ depending on how the government closes the fis-
cal gap. For example, we can consider increasing lump-sum taxes uniformly and raising marginal income
tax rates proportionally as two polar cases of a tax increase in terms of its progressivity. Thus, these two
cases roughly show the possible range of the macroeconomic and welfare effects of the aging population
with a budgetary feedback. Updating the model used in this paper, we can easily analyze the effects of
more complex policy changes, such as a deficit-financing policy change, a phased-in policy change, or more
specifically, an increase in the full retirement age, an increase in the maximum taxable earnings for the
OASDI payroll tax, a means-tested OASI benefits, and so on. In this way, the model and the procedure
demonstrated in this paper will work as the platform of the future fiscal policy analyses on the aging pop-
ulation and help policymakers by providing both macroeconomic and distributional effects of their reform
plans aimed to close the fiscal gap generated by the aging population.
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